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dence on deviant cases, discuss predictions, and future work to explore some of the problems indicated by this kind of analysis. An appendix contains informal definitions and a discussion of the statistical terminology used in the paper.
I. THE BUDGETARY PROCESS
Decisions depend upon calculation of which alternatives to consider and to choose.2 A major clue toward understanding budgeting is the extraordinary complexity of the calculations involved. There are a huge number of items to be considered, many of which are of considerable technical difficulty. There is, however, little or no theory in most areas of policy which would enable practitioners to predict the consequences of alternative moves and the probability of their occurring. Nor has anyone solved the imposing problem of the inter-personal comparison of utilities. Outside of the political process, there is no agreed upon way of comparing and evaluating the merits of different programs for different people whose preferences vary in kind and in intensity.
Participants in budgeting deal with their overwhelming burdens by adopting aids to calculation. By far the most important aid to calculation is the incremental method. Budgets are almost never actively reviewed as a whole in the sense of considering at once the value of all existing programs as compared to all possible alternatives. Instead, this year's budget is based on last year's budget, with special attention given to a narrow range of increases or decreases.
Incremental calculations proceed from an existing base. (By "base" we refer to commonly held expectations among participants in budgeting that programs will be carried out at close to the going level of expenditures.) The widespread sharing of deeply held expectations concerning the organization's base provides a powerful (although informal) means of securing stability.
The most effective coordinating mechanisms in budgeting undoubtedly stem from the roles adopted by the major participants. Roles (the expectations of behavior attached to institutional positions) are parts of the division of labor. They are calculating mechanisms. In American national government, the administrative agencies act as advocates of increased expenditure, the Bureau of the Budget acts as Presidential servant with a cutting bias, the House Appropriations Committee functions as a guardian of the Treasury, and the Senate Appropriations Committee as an appeals court to which agencies carry their disagreements with House action. The roles fit in with one another and set up patterns of mutual expectations which markedly reduce the burden of calculation for the participants. Since the agencies can be depended upon to advance all the programs for which there is prospect of support, the Budget Bureau and the Appropriations Committees respectively can concentrate on fitting them into the President's program or paring them down.
Possessing the greatest expertise and the largest numbers, working in the closest proximity to their policy problems and clientele groups, and desiring to expand their horizons, administrative agencies generate action through advocacy. But if they ask for amounts much larger than the appropriating bodies believe reasonable, the agencies' credibility will suffer a drastic decline. In such circumstances, the reviewing organs are likely to cut deeply, with the result that the agency gets much less than it might have with a more moderate request. So the first guide for decision is: do not come in too high. Yet the agencies must also not come in too low, for the reviewing bodies assume that if agency advocates do not ask for funds they do not need them. Thus, the agency decision rule might read: come in a little too high (padding), but not too high (loss of confidence).
Agencies engage in strategic planning to secure these budgetary goals. Strategies are the links between the goals of the agencies and their perceptions of the kinds of actions which will be effective in their political environment. Budget officers in American national government uniformly believe that being a good politician-cultivation of an active clientele, development of confidence by other officials (particularly the appropriations subcommittees), and skill in following strategies which exploit opportunities-is more important in obtaining funds than demonstration of agency efficiency.
In deciding how much money to recommend for specific purposes, the House Appropriations Committee breaks down into largely autonomous subcommittees in which the norm of reciprocity is carefully followed. Specialization is carried further as subcommittee members develop limited areas of competence and jurisdiction. Budgeting is both incremental and fragmented as the subcommittees deal with adjustments to the historical base of each agency. The attitudes and calculations of participants in budgeting seem stable over time. The prominence of the agency's "base" is a sign of stability. The roles of the major participants are powerful, persistent, and strongly grounded in the expectations of others as well as in the internal requirements of the positions. Stabiltiy is also suggested by the specialization that occurs among the participants, the long service of committee members, the adoption of incremental practices such as comparisons with the previous year, the fragmentation of appropriations by program and item, the treatments of appropriations as continuously variable sums of money rather than as perpetual reconsiderations of the worth of programs, and the practice of allowing past decisions to stand while coordinating decision-making only if difficulties arise. Since the budgetary process appears to be stable over periods of time, it is reasonable to estimate the relationships in budgeting on the basis of time series data.
Special events that upset the apparent stability of the budgetary process can and do occur. Occasionally, world events take an unexpected turn, a new President occupies the White House, some agencies act with exceptional zeal, others suffer drastic losses of confidence on the part of the appropriations subcommittees, and so on. It seems plausible to represent such transient events as random shocks to an otherwise deterministic system. Therefore, our model is stochastic rather than deterministic.
The Politics of the Budgetary Process contains a description of strategies which various participants in budgeting use to further their aims. Some of these strategies are quite complicated. However, a large part of the process can be explained by some of the simpler strategies which are based on the relationship between agency requests for funds (through the Budget Bureau) and Congressional appropriations. Because these figures are made public and are known to all participants, because they are directly perceived and communicated without fear of information loss or bias, and because the participants react to these figures, they are ideal for feedback purposes. It is true that there are other indicators-special events, crises, technological developments, actions of clientele groups-which are attended to by participants in the budgetary process. But if these indicators have impact, they must quickly be reflected in the formal feedback mechanismsthe actions of departments, the Bureau of the Budget, and Congress-to which they are directed. Some of these indicators (see section iv) are represented by the stochastic disturbances. Furthermore, the formal indicators are more precise, more simple, more available, more easily interpreted than the others. They are, therefore, likely to be used by participants in the budgetary process year in and year out. Present decisions are based largely on past experience, and this lore is encapsulated in the amounts which the agencies receive as they go through the steps in the budgetary cycle.
For all the reasons discussed in this section, our models of the budgetary process are linear, stable over periods of time, stochastic, and strategic in character. They are "as if" models: an excellent fit for a given model means only that the actual behavior of the participants has an effect equivalent to the equations of the model. The models, taken as a whole, represent a set of decision rules for Congress and the agencies.
II. THE MODELS
In our models we aggregate elements of the decision-making structure. The Budget Bureau submissions for the agency are used instead of separate figures for the two kinds of organizations. Similarly, at this stage in our analysis, we use final Congressional appropriations instead of separating out committee action, floor action, conference committee recommendations, and so on. We wish to emphasize that although there may be some aggregation bias in the estimation of the postulated structure of decision, this does not affect the linearity of the aggregate relationships. If the decisions of an agency and the Bureau of the Budget with regard to that agency depend linearly upon the same variable (as we hypothesize), then the aggregated decision rule of the two, treated as a single entity, will depend linearly upon that variable. By a similar argument, the various Congressional participants can be grouped together so that Congress can be regarded as a single decision-making entity. While the aggregating procedure may result in grouping positive and negative influences together, this manifestly does not affect the legitimacy of the procedure; linearity is maintained.3
Our models concern only the requests presented in the President's budget for an individual agency and the behavior of Congress as a whole with regard to the agency's appropriation. The models do not attempt to estimate the complete decision-making structure for each agency from bureau requests to departments to submission through the Budget Bureau to possible final action in the Senate and House. There are several reasons for remaining content with the aggregated figures we use. First, the number of possible decision rules which must be considered grows rapidly as each new participant is added. We would soon be overwhelmed by the sheer number of rules invoked. Second, there are genuine restrictions placed on the number of structural parameters we can estimate because (a) some data, such as bureau requests to departments, are unavailable, and (b) only short time series are meaningful for most agencies. It would make no sense, for example, to go back in time beyond the end of World War II when most domestic activity was disrupted.4
Since the agencies use various strategies and Congress may respond to them in various ways, we propose several alternative systems of equations. These equations represent alternative decision rules which may be followed by Congressional and agency-Budget Bureau participants in the budgetary process. One important piece of data for agency-Budget Bureau personnel who are formulating appropriations requests is the most recent Congressional appropriation. Thus, we make considerable use of the concept "base," operationally defined as the previous Congressional appropriation for an agency, in formulating our decision rules. Since the immediate past exercises such a heavy influence on budgetary outcomes, Markov (simultaneous, difference) equations are particularly useful. In these Markov processes, the value of certain variables at one point in time is dependent on their value at one or more immediately previous periods as well as on the particular circumstances of the time.
We postulate several decision rules for both the agency-Budget Bureau requests and for Congressional action on these requests. For each series of requests or appropriations, we select from the postulated decision rules that rule which most closely represents the behavior of the aggregated entities. We use the variables yt the appropriation passed by Congress for any given agency in the year t. Supplemental appropriations are not included in the yt. x: the appropriation requested by the Bureau of the Budget for any given agency for the year t. The xt constitutes the President's budget request for an agency.
We will also introduce certain symbols representing random disturbances of each of the postulated relationships. These symbols are explained as they are introduced. A. Equations for Agency-Budget Bureau Decision Rules. The possibility that different agencies use different strategies makes it necessary to construct alternative equations representing these various strategies. Then, for each agency in our sample, we use time series data to select that equation which seems to describe best the budgetary decisions of that agency. In this section we present three simple models of agency requests. The first states agency requests as a function of the previous year's appropriation. The second states requests as a function of the previous appropriation as well as a function of the differences between the not realistic to expect meaningful time series of great length to be accumulated for most agencies in the United States government. agency request and appropriation in the previous year. The third states requests as a function of the previous year's request. In all three linear models provision is made for a random variable to take into account the special circumstances of the time.
An agency, while convinced of the worth of its programs, tends to be aware that extraordinarily large or small requests are likely to be viewed with suspicion by Congress; an agency does not consider it desirable to make extraordinary requests, which might precipitate unfavorable Congressional reaction. Therefore, the agency usually requests a precentage (generally greater than one hundred percent) of its previous year's appropriation. This percentage is not fixed: in the event of favorable circumstances, the request is a larger percentage of the previous year's appropriation than would otherwise be the case; similarly, the percentage might be reduced in the event of unfavorable circumstances.
Decisions made in the manner described above may be represented by a simple equation. If we take the average of the percentages that are implicitly or explicitly used by budget officers, then any request can be represented by the sum of this average percentage of the previous year's appropriation plus the increment or decrement due to the favorable or unfavorable circumstances. Thus We have chosen to view the special events of each year for each agency as random phenomena that are capable of being described by a probability density or distribution. We assume here that the random variable is normally distributed with mean zero and an unknown but finite variance. Given this specification of the random variable, the agency makes its budgeting decisions as if it were operating by the postulated decision rule given by equation (1).
An agency, although operating somewhat like the organizations described by equation (1), may wish to take into account an additional strategic consideration: while this agency makes a request which is roughly a fixed percentage of the previous year's appropriation, it also desires to smooth out its stream of appropriations by taking into account the difference between its request and appropriation for the previous year. If there were an unusually large cut in the previous year's request, the agency submits a "padded" estimate to make up for the loss in expected funds; an unusual increase is followed by a reduced estimate to avoid unspent appropriations. This behavior may be represented by equation or decision rule where The agency request (through the Budget Bureau) for a certain year is a fixed mean percentage of the Congressional appropriation for that agency in the previous year plus a fixed mean percentage of the difference between the Congressional appropriation and the agency request for the previous year plus a stochastic disturbance. xt is a stochastic disturbance, which plays the role described for the random variable in equation (1), the O's are variables reflecting the aspects of the previous year's request and appropriation that an agency takes into account: A3 represents the mean percentage of the previous year's request which is taken into account, and O2 represents the mean percentage of the difference between the previous year's appropriation and request (yt.,-xti) which is taken into account. Note that 12 <O is anticipated so that a large cut will (in the absence of the events represented by the stochastic disturbance) be followed by a padded estimate and vice-versa.' 6 Since some readers may not be familiar with in an attempt to discover if naive models would fit as well as those above. In no case did this occur and generally the fits for this model were very poor. A similar scheme was estimated for the appropriations ye of an individual agency with similar results with respect to qeuations (4), (7) and (8) where vt is a stochastic disturbance representing that part of the appropriations attributable to the special circumstances that cause Congress to deviate from a relatively fixed percentage. Therefore, when agency aims and Congressional desires markedly differ from usual (so that Congress may be said to depart from its usual rule) the stochastic disturbance takes on an unusually large positive or negative value. In order to distingush this case from the previous one, more must be specified about the stochastic disturbance vt. In a year following one in which agency aims and Congressional desires markedly differed, the agency makes a request closer to Congressional desires, and/or Congress shifts its desires closer to those of the agency (or the President). In the year after a deviation, then, assume that Congress will tend to make allowances to normalize the situation. Such behavior can be represented by having the stochastic disturbance vt generated in accordance with a first order Markov scheme. The stochastic component in vt is itself determined by a relation ( where vt is a stochastic disturbance whose value in any particular year represents the part of the appropriation attributable to the agency's special circumstances of the year. One might expect that Congress takes only "partial" account of the remainder represented by Xt, SO 0 <a4<1.
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Times series data for the period 1947-1963 were studied for fifty-six non-defense agencies of the United States Government. The requests (xt) of these agencies were taken to be the amounts presented to Congress in the President's budget. For eight sub-agencies from the National Institutes of Health, data for a shorter period of time were considered, and the requests (xt) of these eight sub-agencies were taken to be their proposals to the Bureau of the Budget.8 In all instances the Congressional decision variable (ye) was taken to be the final appropriation before any supplemental additions. The total appropriations (without supplements) of the agencies studied amounted to approximately twenty-seven percent of the non-defense budget in 1963. Over one-half of all non-defense agencies were investigated; the major omissions being the Post Office and many independent agencies. A minimum of three agencies was examined from each of the Treasury, Justice, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, and Health, Education and Welfare Departments.9
If the agency-Budget Bureau disturbance is independent of Congressional disturbances the use of ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate most of the possible combinations of the proposed decision equations is justified. OLS is identical to the simultaneous full information maximum likelihood (FIML) technique for most of the present systems. This is not so, however, for some systems of equations because of the presence of an auto-correlated disturbance in one equation of the two and the consequent non-linearity of the estimating equations. In equation (6) the stochastic disturbance for year t is a function of the value of the disturbance in the previous year. In a system of equations in which auto-correlation occurs in the first equation, an appropriate 9 Three interrelated difficulties arise in the analysis of the time series data xt, ye for an agency. The first problem is the choice of a technique for estimating the parameters of the alternate schemes in some optimal fashion. Given these estimates and their associated statistics, the second problem is the choice of criteria for selecting the model best specifying the system underlying the data. Finally, one is faced with the problem of examining the variability of the underlying parameters of the best specification. We believe that our solution to these problems, while far from optimal, is satisfactory given the present state of econometric knowledge. 10 We make the assumption that these two disturbances are independent throughout the paper. Notice, however, that dependence between the disturbances explicitly enters decision equation (8) of section II and those of footnote 7. For these equations, the assumption refers to the disturbance of the current year. That is, we allow the possibility that special circumstances may affect a single participant (Bureau of the Budget or Congress) as well as both. When the latter case occurred, our selection criteria resulted in the choice of equation (8) procedure is to use OLS to estimate the alternative proposals for the other equation, decide by the selection criteria which best specifies the data, use the knowledge of this structure to estimate the first equation, and then decide, through use of appropriate criteria, which version of the first equation best specifies the data.
The principal selection criterion we used is that of maximum (adjusted) correlation coefficient (R). For a given dependent variable this criterion leads one to select from alternative specifications of the explanatory variables, that specification which leads to the highest sample correlation coefficient. The estimations of the alternative specifications must, of course, be made from the same data." The second criterion involves the use of the d-statistic test for serial correlation of the estimated residuals of a single equation.'2 This statistic tests the null hypothesis of residual independence against the alternative of serial correlation. We used the significance points for the d-statistic of Theil and Nagar.'3 When the d-statistic was found to be significant in fitting the Congressional decision equation (4) to an agency's data, it was always found that equation (7) best specified Congressional behavior with respect to the appropriations of that agency in the sense of yielding the maximum correlation coefficient. A third criterion is based on a test of the significance of the sample correlation between the residuals of (4) and the estimated Xt of the equation selected previously for a given agency. David's significance points for this statistic were used to make a two-tailed test at the five percent level of the null hypothesis that the residuals are uncorrelated.'4 When significant 11 We are estimating the unknown values of the coefficients (or parameters) of regression equations for each agency. All of our estimators are biased. We use biased estimators for the simple reason that no unbiased estimators are known. Table 2 presents a summary of the combinations of the Agency-Bureau of the Budget and Congressional decision equations. For those agencies studied, the most popular combinations of behavior are the simple ones represented by equations (4) and (1) respectively. When Congress uses a sophisticated "gaming" strategy such as (7) or (8), the corresponding agency-Bureau of the Budget decision equation is the relatively simple (1). And, when Congress grants exactly or almost exactly the amount requested by an agency, the agency tends to use decision equation (3).
Our discussion thus far has assumed fixed values for the coefficients (parameters) of the equations we are using to explain the behavior underlying the budgetary process. In the light of the many important events occurring in the period from 1946 to 1963, however, it seems reasonable to suppose that the appropriations structure of many government agencies was altered. If this is correct, the coefficients of the equations-literally, in this context, the values represented by the on-the-average percentages requested by the agencies and granted by Congress-should change from one period of time to the next. The equations would then be temporally stable for a period, but not forever. The year when the coefficient of an equation changes from one value to another is termed the "shift point". The time series we are using are so short that it is possible to find only one meaningful shift point in each of the two equations that describe the budget request and appropriation best fitting an agency. We, therefore, broke each time series into two parts and used Chow's F-statistic'6 to determine temporal stability by testing the null hypothesis that the underlying coefficients did not shift (against all alternatives) for the individual equations. We used four categories for the coefficients of a decision equation defined as follows:
Temporally 17 In a few instances an inspection of the residuals indicated that a shift point occurred so early or so late in the series that it was not possible to compute a meaningful stationarity F-Statistic. In these few cases the deviant observations were dropped and the usual analysis performed on the shortened time series. Thus we "forced" a break in every case in order to perform subsequent operations. Table 4 shows clearly that fits are better for the second period, which is sufficient evidence of increasing linear tendencies. To us it seems reasonable to expect an increasing use of simplifying rules of thumb as the budget grows in size and the pressure of time on key decision makers increases. Yet this is 18 The apparent discrepancy between the latter part of Table 3 and Table 1 is caused by the fact that for two agencies, the Bureau of the Census and the Office of Education, although the AgencyBureau of the Budget decision equations are temporally stable and best specified as (1), when a shift point is forced, the criteria indicate (3) for the latter period.
19 Some of the shift points appeared to occur so early in the series that it was not possible to calculate a correlation coefficient. 
When those parts of requests and appropriations directly related to loans are omitted from the data for both the Rural Electrification Administration and the Federal Housing
Administration, the estimated coefficients are of the magnitudes expected with fo > and a0 < 1. However, when the data relating to loans are included, then I3o < 1 and ao > 1. Apparently, Congress favors the loan programs more than do the agencies or the Budget Bureau. As a rule, the d-statistics resulting from fitting the best specifications were not significant. It would thus appear that all major underlying trended variables (with the possible exception of variables with the same trend) have been accounted for by these specifications. When an exception to this rule did exist, the authors made a careful examination of the residuals in an effort to determine the reason for such a situation. It appeared that in most of these instances the cause was either (a) that the coefficients shifted slowly over several years and not abruptly at one point in time, or (b) that restricting the search to only one shift point left undetected an additional shift either very early or very late in the series.
In an attempt to unmask the trended variable most likely (in our opinion) to have been ignored, and to cast some light upon the notion of "fair share," final appropriations yt for each agency were regressed on total non-defense appropriations zt. This time series was taken from the Statistical Abstract of the United States. The results were poor. Indeed, the sample correlations between yt and zt are usually worse than those between ye and xt.
Moreover, the d-statistics are usually highly significant and the residual patterns for the regression show the agency's proportion of the non-defense budget to be either increasing or decreasing over time. However, it should be noted that even those exceptional cases where the agency trend is close to that of the total non-defense appropriation do not invalidate the explicit decision structure fitted here. A similar study, with similar results, was conducted at the departmental level by regressing yt for the eight National Institutes of Health on yt for the Public Health Service, the agency of which they are a part. Finally, the yt for selected pairs of agencies with "similar" interests were regressed on each other with uniformly poor results.
Although empirical evidence indicates that our models describe the budgetary process of the United States government, we are well aware of certain deficiencies in our work. One deficiency, omission of certain agencies from the study, is not serious because over one-half of all non-defense agencies were investigated. Nevertheless, the omission of certain agencies may have left undiscovered examples of additional decision rules. We will shortly study all agencies whose organizational structure can be traced. We will also include supplemental appropriations.
A more serious deficiency may lie in the fact that the sample sizes, of necessity, are small. The selection criterion of maximum sample correlation, therefore, lacks proper justification, and is only acceptable because of the lack of a better criterion. Further, full-information maximum likelihood estimators, and especially biased ones, even when they are known to be consistent, are not fully satisfactory in such a situation, although they may be the best available. However, the remedy for these deficiencies must await the results of future theoretical research on explosive or evolutionary processes.
IV. THE DEVIANT CASES AND PREDICTION:

INTERPRETATION OF THE STOCHASTIC
DISTURBANCES
The intent of this section is to clarify further the interpretation of the stochastic disturbances as special or unusual circumstances represented by random variables. While those influences present at a constant level during the period serve only to affect the magnitude of the coefficients, the special circumstances have an important, if subsidiary, place in these models. We have indicated that although outside observers can view the effects of special circumstances as a random variable, anyone familiar with all the facts available to the decision- , 1960) . 21 We are indebted to Rose M. Kelly, a graduate student in the Department of Political Science, Tables 6 and 7. sider would have to regard them as essentially random disturbances to an otherwise deterministic system. Indeed, no two events in the categories of Table 7 are likely, a priori, either to be the same or to occur in any particular year.
Significant Policy Change
The 
Large New Legislative Program
This is especially apt to affect an agency if it is required to implement several new programs simultaneously. The Commissioner of Education said in reference to the student loan program, "We have no way of knowing because we never had such a program, and many of the institutions never had them." The NDEA Act alone had ten new entitlements.
Reorganization of an Agency
The only example is the Agricultural Marketing Service's appropriation for 1962. Funds were reduced because of a consolidation of diverse activities by the Secretary of Agriculture and not through reorganization as a result of Congressional demands.
Non-identifiable
This applies, for example, to the Public Health Service where a combination of lesser factors converge to make the agency extremely deviant for 1959, 1960, 1961, and 1962 . Among the apparent causes of deviance are publicity factors, the roles of committee chairmen in both House and Senate, a high percentage of professionals in the agency, and the excellent press coverage of health research programs. No one factor appears primarily responsible for the deviance.
Our models are not predictive but explanatory. The alternate decision equations can be tried and the most appropriate one used when data on requests and appropriations are available. The appropriate equation explains the data in that, given a good fit, the process behaves "as if" the data were generated according to the equation. Thus, our explanatory models are backward looking: given a history of requests and appropriations, the data appears as if they were produced by the proposed and appropriately selected scheme.
The models are not predictive because the budget process is only temporally stable for short periods. We have found cases in which the coefficients of the equations change, i.e., cases in which there are alterations in the realized behavior of the processes. We have no a priori theory to predict the occurrence of these changes, but merely our ad hoc observation that most occurred during Eisenhower's first term. Predictions are necessarily based upon the estimated values of the coefficients and on the statistical properties of the stochastic disturbance (sometimes called the error term). Without a scientific method of predicting the shift points in our model, we cannot scientifically say that a request or an appropriation for some future year will fall within a prescribed range with a given level of confidence. We can predict only when the process remains stable in time. If the decision rules of the participants have changed, our predictions may be worthless: in our models, either the coefficients have shifted or, more seriously, the scheme has changed. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to determine whether or not the observation latest in time represents a shift point. A sudden change may be the result either of a change in the underlying process or a temporary setting aside of the usual decision rules in light of special circumstances. The data for several subsequent years are necessary to determine with any accuracy whether a change in decision rules indeed occurred.
It is possible, of course, to make conditional predictions by taking the estimated coefficients from the last shift point and assuming that no shift will occur. Limited predictions as to the next year's requests and appropriations could be made and might turn out to be reasonably accurate. However, scholarly efforts would be better directed toward knowledge of why, where and when changes in the process occur so that accurate predictions might be made.
The usual interpretation of stochastic (in lieu of deterministic) models may, of course, be made for the models of this paper, i.e., not all factors influencing the budgetary process have been included in the equations. Indeed, many factors often deemed most important such as pressure from interest groups, are ignored. Part of the reason for this lies in the nature of the models: they describe the decision process in skeleton form. Further, since the estimations are made, of necessity, on the basis of time series data, it is apparent that any influences that were present at a constant level during the period are not susceptible to discovery by these methods. However, these influences do affect the budgetary process by determining the size of the estimated coefficients. Thus, this paper, in making a comparative study of the estimated coefficients for the various agencies, suggests a new way of approaching constant influences.
No theory can take every possible unexpected circumstance into account, but our theory can be enlarged to include several classes of events. The concentration of shift points in the first years of the Eisenhower administration implies that an empirical theory should take account of changes in the political party controlling the White House and Congress.
We also intend to determine indices of clientele and confidence so that their effects, when stable over time, can be gauged.22 Presidents sometimes attempt to gear their budgetary requests to fit their desired notion of the rate of expenditures appropriate for the economic level they wish the country to achieve. By checking the Budget Message, contemporary accounts, and memoirs, we hope to include a term (as a dummy variable) which would enable us to predict high and low appropriations rates depending on the President's intentions.
V. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FINDINGS
We wish to consider the significance of (a) the fact that it is possible to find equations which explain major facets of the federal budgetary process and (b) the particular equations fitted to the time series. We will take up each point in order.
A. It is possible to find equations for the budgetary process. There has been controversy for some time over whether it is possible to find laws, even of a probabilistic character, which explain important aspects of the political process. The greatest skepticism is reserved for laws which would explain how policy is made or account for the outcomes of the political process. Without engaging in further abstract speculation, it is apparent that the best kind of proof would be a demonstration of the existence of some such laws. This, we believe, we have done.
Everyone agrees that the federal budget is terribly complex. Yet, as we have shown, the budgetary process can be described by very simple decision rules. Work done by Simon, Newell, Reitman, Clarkson, Cyert and March, and others, on simulating the solution of complex problems, has demonstrated that in complicated situations human beings are likely to use heuristic rules or rules of thumb to enable them to find satisfactory solutions. The most striking fact about the equations is their simplicity. This is perhaps partly because of the possibility that more complicated decision procedures are reserved for special circumstances represented by extreme values of the random variable. However, the fact that the decision rules generally fit the data very well is an indication that these simple equations have considerable explanatory power. Little of the variance is left unexplained.
What is the significance of the fact that the budgetary process follows rather simple laws for the general study of public policy? Perhaps the significance is limited; perhaps other policy processes are far more complex and cannot be reduced to simple laws. However, there is no reason to believe that this is the case. On the contrary, when one considers the central importance of budgeting in the political processfew activities can be carried on without funds -and the extraordinary problems of calculation which budgeting presents, a case might better be made for its comparative complexity than for its simplicity. At present it is undoubtedly easier to demonstrate that laws, whether simple or complex, do underlie the B. The significance of the particular equations. Let us examine the concepts that have been built into the particular equations. First, the importance of the previous year's appropriation is an indication that the notion of the base is a very significant explanatory concept for the behavior of the agencies and the Budget Bureau. Similarly, the agency-Budget Bureau requests are important variables in the decisions of Congress. Second, some of the equations, notably (7) and (8) for Congress, and (2) for the agency-Budget Bureau, incorporate strategic concepts. On some occasions, then, budgeting on the federal level does involve an element of gaming. Neither the Congress nor the agencies can be depended upon to "take it lying down." Both attempt to achieve their own aims and goals. Finally, the budgetary processs is only temporally stable. The occurrence of most changes of decision rules at a change in administration indicates that alterations in political party and personnel occupying high offices can exert some (but not total) influence upon the budgetary process.
Our decision rules may serve to cast some light on the problem of "power" in political analysis. The political scientist's dilemma is that it is hardly possible to think about politics without some concept of power, but that it is extremely difficult to create and then to use an operational definition in empirical work. Hence, James March makes the pessimistic conclusion that "The Power of Power" as a political variable may be rather low.26 The problem is particularly acute when dealing with processes in which there is a high degree of mutual dependence among the participants. In budgeting, for example, the agency-Budget Bureau and Congressional relationships hardly permit a strict differentiation of the relative influence of the participants. general models of organizations and not with individual policies. One cannot say anything directly about water, land, health, or other transportation policies, from inspection of our models of a given agency. But this limit is not inherent in our approach. It is possible, for example, to calculate from our data present and future estimated rates of growth for virtually all domestic agencies since World War II. Agencies with similar growth rates may be segregated and examined for common features. The growth rates of agencies in similar areas of policy, such as public health and natural resources, may be compared, and the fortunes of policies in those areas deduced. Individual agencies may be broken down into sub-units or the courses of certain policy programs charted to explain the differential treatment they receive. While pursuing this type of analysis, we hope to have one advantage. We shall be working from a general model of the budgetary process. It will, therefore, be possible for us to locate our efforts within this larger scheme. To know whether one is dealing with a normal or deviant case, to know one's position in this larger universe, is to be able to give more general meaning to the individual and particular circumstances with which one must be involved in handling small parts of the total process.
The general mode of analysis we have developed here may be pursued in many different contexts. Similar studies could be undertaken in state and local governments as well as foreign countries.27 Private firms and public agencies may be conceptualized in parallel terms through their budgetary mechanisms.28 By comparing the processes underlying budgeting in a variety of political and economic systems, it may be possible to state more elegantly and precisely the conditions under which different forms of behavior would prevail.
APPENDIX
On the Definition of Terms
Certain of the technical terms required in the paper are here given informal definitions. Serially Independent: If successive realizations of a random variable are serially independent, the value it assumes in one period is independent of the value it assumed in a previous period. This can be described mathematically as E(xt xt-1) =E(xt), meaning that the expected value of random variable x at period t does not depend upon the value that the random variable x assumed at period t -1. It follows that the expected simple correlation between xt and xti will be zero, if the random variable x is serially independent. For example, in our models, the assumption of serial independence of the disturbances reflects the belief that special circumstances in one year either do not affect special circumstances in succeeding years or that their influence enters explicitly into our model (as in equation (8) and the equations of footnote 4).
The Meaning of a Markov Process
For our purposes, a Markov process generating some random variable x, is a process for which the value of x at time t depends upon the values assumed by that random variable at one or more earlier periods plus the value assumed by some stochastic disturbance at time t. A Markov process is "first order" if the variable xt takes on a value that depends only upon the value of the variable xti-in the previous period plus the value of a stochastic disturbance at time t. Thus Xi = aXt-1 + et is a first order Markov process where et is a random variable with a given distribution and a is a non-zero constant. A second order Markov process can be described by xt =ix t-1 + a2Xt-2 + 'Et where both a, and a2 are non-zero constants. The value of the variable xt now depends upon its values in two previous periods.
On the Meaning of Goodness of Fit
An intuitive notion of good fit for a linear regression equation is that in a scatter diagram the observations should cluster about the fitted line. Probably the most popular measure of good fit is the square of the multiple correlationcoefficient (R2), which may often be interpreted as the percentage of the variance of the dependent variable that is explained by the postulated linear relationship (regression). For our models however, this interpretation is not valid, although the adjusted R gives a rough measure of the goodness of fit. The closer to 1 that the adjusted B is, the better the fit.
On Standard Deviations of Coefficient Estimates
Speaking roughly, these standard deviations measure the reliability of the estimates of the coefficients. The smaller the estimated standard deviation, the more accurate the estimated coefficient is likely to be. If we had another series of data generated from the same process, the smaller the standard deviation of the coefficient (estimated from the first data) in relation to the size of this coefficient, the more likely it is that a new estimate made on the basis of the hypothetical new series of data would be close to the estimate made from the original data. Generally, one hopes the estimated standard deviation of the coefficient is at least as small as one-half the size of the estimated coefficient.
On Biased and Unbiased Estimators
Think of the problem of trying to determine the average IQ of students at a large university. Suppose the administration would not allow access to records and one did not wish to give IQ tests to all students. One might select a certain number of students at random (a sample) and give them the tests. The test scores of these students are sample observations. One might compute the average of these test scores and claim that he has an estimate of the mean IQ of all students at the University. The estimator is the formula for the average of the sample observations. If he repeated the process, taking a new sample, it is possible that the estimator would produce a slightly different estimate of the mean. However, the estimator would still have a certain expected value. If the expected value of the estimator can be proven to equal the population parameter (the mean IQ of all the students example) then the estimator is said to be unbiased. Otherwise, it is said to be biased.
On Consistent Estimators
An estimator is consistent if it approaches nearer and nearer to the true value of a parameter (in our case, a coefficient) as the size of the sample is increased. A consistent estimator may be biased (it may approach closer to but never actually equal the parameter), but if the sample from which it is estimated is large enough this bias will be small.
On Least-Squares Estimators and the Meaning of Temporally Stable Processes
This discussion specifically refers to process (4) although it is equally applicable to all processes. Consider Yt aoxt + nt where a represents the coefficient of the equation or the "on the average" percentage of the request that is granted by Congress and qt is a stochastic disturbance (random variable) that represents the variation in the request over time that may be assigned to special circumstances. We assume that 77t is normally distributed with mean zero and finite but unknown variance. The coefficient is unknown and must be estimated on the basis of available data. The data are the requests xt and the corresponding appropriations Yt. We do not know the values assumed by the stochastic disburbance. Our estimates of the values assumed by the stochastic disturbance are the residuals of the fitted regression equation. If, for a given agency, we observe the requests and appropriations over a specified period of time, we could plot the data in a scatter diagram (Fig. 1) . The line drawn in Fig.  1 would be our estimated line (the line resulting from our estimate of a).
The vertical positive and negative distances of the points from the fitted line are the values of the residuals, our estimates of the values assumed by the stochastic disturbance.
The least-squares estimates of the coefficients are those values of the coefficients which make the sum of the squares of these distances a minimum. In Fig. 1 , there is no discernible pattern of departure of the points from the line.
Thus, we can say that the process is temporally stable (i.e., fixed over time) and presume that the true value of the coefficient (we know only its estimated value) remained constant during the period under consideration. A temporally stable process is one in which the value of the true coefficient does not change during the period under consideration. This should not be confused with a stable or non-evolutionary process, i.e., one whose If we again plotted the requests and appropriations data for an agency and found the results to be as in Fig. 2 , the longest line would represent our first fitted equation (or the equation resulting from our first estimate of the value of the coefficient). The points (alternately the residuals) form a pattern of departure from the fitted line. In the early years (a) they fall mostly above the line and in the later years (b) they fall mostly below the line. The process must have been temporally unstable for the period as a whole, i.e., the coefficient had one true value during the first years of the period and a different true value during the last years.
A temporally unstable process is one in which the true coefficient assumes two or more values during the period under consideration. Since we only know the estimated coefficient, we must examine the residuals to determine whether such a pattern is present. Then, we select what appears to be the probable year of change, and fit two lines such as those drawn in above. We then compute the F Statistic to make our statistical test to determine, at a given level of significance, whether or not the true value of the coefficient shifted. If it was found to shift, the process was temporally stable for some period of time but not necessarily for the entire series of time periods examined.
The Meaning of a Shift Point and a Break Point
The two second lines fitted to Figure 2 represent the true process. The year during which the coefficient changes (the year when the pattern shifts from clustering about line (a) to clustering about line (b) is referred to as a shift point. If what appears at first to be a shift in the true value of the coefficient is actually an alteration in behavior so that one equation fits the first subperiod and another equation must be used for the second sub-period, we still refer to the year of the change in realized behavior as a shift point. Break point is the term used to describe a suspected shift point but for which the F-test indicates that the true coefficient value did not shift.
